A favourite move amongst novice chess players is, in a moderately dangerous situation, put one’s queen in the firing line of the opposition’s queen, in the hope that they shall shy away. Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif tried to play the move by conceding the Seraiki province but demanding that Karachi be declared a province too.
Little did he realise, in pulling the Karachi ploy, he had no chess piece backing his piece. He conceded, Southern Punjab, his piece without really threatening the other piece. He pulled a poor dummy. And this has accelerated the path towards the creation of a Seraiki province.
But it is not the present political chessboard that we wish to locate our analysis on. We wish to situate it in terms of the history and present of the people’s that inhabit the Seraiki region. It is through such an analysis that we hope to assess the merits and de-merits of the Seraiki province proposal – a proposal that this article, at the outset, concedes that it supports.
But intelligence is to be critically cautious of what one supports – and to be aware of the principles upon which the support is constituted. Thus – this shall be a cautious article geared at arguing for a Seraiki province.
Why divide Punjab?
The Punjab, in terms of both its present and colonial history, has been signified by Lahore and its Northern regions. The past, however, belonged to Multan, Bahawalpur and Uch Sharif. At different nodes in sub-continental history, each of the three was an important cultural and economic centre and a centre of power. With the British re-demarcation of the province of the Punjab, the centrality of these three cities was lost.
In a similar vein, rural South Punjab was subjected to similar neglect. More than neglect, the greatest running grievance has been that development has come but for the migrant only. The local has been neglected. The creation of barrages (Taunsa and Chasma barrage fall in the area) and the carving of canals has displaced locals from their farmland and destroyed lifestyles in harmony with the geography of the region.
During travels in the Seraiki lands after the floods, the idea that the Takht-e-Lahore (throne of Lahore) had been siphoning upto Rs 60 crore per year in revenue generated the region was found articulated. Once when asked to speak at a public forum, this writer had to pun upon himself as a representative of the oppressor to break communicative ground with the audience. Once that ground had been broken, this writer was thrown into the dilemma of what language to speak: Urdu? Punjabi? a mixture of both came out and the stage had to be ceded to a laughing audience.
Why do I narrate this light-hearted story? It is to point out two things. One, that the language spoken is Seraiki. Even though it takes from both Punjabi and Sindhi (Sindhi more dominantly), it constitutes a separate language form. Two, that the idea that Lahore is the oppressor and the Seraiki waseb is the marginalised in widely prevalent and founded upon reality.
The region faces a three-tiered marginalization: economic, political and cultural.
And its oppressor is (northern) Punjab.
A political turn towards the South:
The marginalization of South Punjab exists at a psychological level: when we think about Punjab we think of the Northern parts and Lahore. Multan constitutes our Southern limit.
This limitation on our thought reflects how the region has fared.
However, in recent history, a rising Seraiki nationalism has meant a shift of focus and a political circus in South Punjab.
The PPP (Gilani’s Multan linkage), the PML-Q (Durrani and the electoral loss of Northern Punjab) and the PML-N (with Danish Schools and other hoolahoops) have turned to battle it out for Southern Punjab. This has meant the last six years and more have seen a diversion of funds towards the ‘development’ of Southern Punjab. But, again, it is important to recognize that this diversion only became possible due to the increased disillusionment of the Seraiki people’s from the centre.
However, the PML-N’s true interests lie in Northern Punjab. Only this year did Shahbaz Sharif move a Neuroscience Institute planned for South Punjab to Lahore. It was a matter over which Pervaiz Elahi raised great hue and cry.
Powerful resentment against Lahore brewing in the South meant this other Lahore-based politician had to speak up about the marginalization of the Seraiki peoples for votes.
Restore Bahawalpur or create Seraikistan?
The debate between the restoration of the Bahawalpur province and the creation of a Seraiki province is a debate between the restoration of an administrative (and political) monopoly versus the creation of a cultural unit.
The idea that there is no difference within the Seraiki area is, of course, false – but there is sufficient homogeniety to argue that a united sense of culture does exist. The 1998 census revealed 14 million Seraiki speakers in Pakistan. However, in 2002, Seraiki nationalists claimed 30 million Seraiki speakers.
What we have been arguing for is to offer support to the ethno-lingual province.
And, more than the nostalgic reminiscing which causes Bahawalpuris (including the old Nawab) to crave the restoration of the Bahawalpur province, the case for a Seraiki province lies in the existence of a coherent cultural unit in the present. The demand for a Seraiki province carries little nostalgia – and therefore there is scope for cultural, political and economic and social regeneration.
It is, in fact, due to the potential for social re-generation that ethno-lingual provinces offer a path for the future.
A separate province as a first step:
The creation of a province is not a solution to the economic ills faced by the average inhabitant of South Punjab. What must be realized is that the creation of a province is not a panacea – but a first step.
What it is ensures, however, is surplus previously siphoned off is spent within the Seraiki region. But - will it solve the woes of the common Seraiki worker?
This is a question that I have repeatedly put to my Seraiki activist friends. Their response is to say, “you help us end your oppression, and, we shall wage a struggle against those amongst us who oppress us.” Again, admittedly it is overtly hopeful to suggest that the structural violence within embodied social structures shall be done away with any time soon, but it is hoped that more focused struggles shall become possible with the granting of provincial status.
Impoverishment, it must be understood, operates at a number of levels. In the argument for a Seraiki province, the hope is to get rid of the impoverishment caused by the province and the federation. What Seraiki activists must remember is to wage the next battle against locals causing impoverishment.
This is essential to overturning the transformations in social structure that accentuate everyday oppression.
Thus to give a province to the Seraiki-speaking people shall constitute the removal of the top-tier of marginalization. The struggle against impoverishment of lower classes we must trust them to conduct themselves.
The case for other ethno-lingual provinces:
One of the apprehensions a number of people have is the fear that the federation shall break. The more centralisation, they argue, the more unity and the more likely it is that ‘Pakistan’ shall survive.
This form of thinking is founds itself upon the idea that being Pakistani means that only one identity configuration can be allowed.
This is a flawed rationale.
The history of the Pakistani state, 64 years now for those who have goldfish memories, offers a different lesson. If a State has been unable to take-over indigenous cultures in such a long period of attempting to manipulate society into its own shape, then, it shall not be able to do so in the medium-term future.
That ethno-lingual movements are rife in the Gilgitis and the Hazaras is a fact we must come to terms with. These are movements we must show respect to. Most certainly each movement is mired in specific political interests; but if nothing else these do take origin from a genuine grievance: people feel disrespected by a State that claims to be their own.
There are, however, genuine questions that one may ask of movements demanding ethno-lingual provinces. The most important of these questions is: what about migrants?
Migration to and from the regions demanding ethno-lingual province status has been continuous. In the Seraiki region, Baloch migrants (100-150 years ago) have broadly assimilated. A similar assimilation has been experienced for the early migrants after partition. But similar processes of assimilation have not taken place for later Punjabi and Pakthun migrants. And the question of their place in the Seraiki provinces future remains.
These are valid questions. And while we must concede the demand of ethno-lingual provinces – and the Seraiki province – we must continue to ask these questions from those who shall take the reins of these new provinces.
- The article was printed in The Review with Pakistan Today on May 01, 2011.
